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INTRODUCTION.
TrrE gravest subject which now presents it elf to the mind

of the

American people, is that concerning which these pages purport to treat.
No one, perhaps, more earne tly than tho writer, has endeavored in an
humble way to su tain the executive arm in it. exerci e of power in crushing a Rebellion instiga.ted by a troa on, for its magnitude and treachery,
without a parallel.

The life of a great nation was at take, and it was

for the maintenance of that life, that for the moment neces ity looked
beyond the purview of constituted law,

Ile who i not reconciled to the

act which that necessity seemed to make imperative upon the part of the
government, has no sympathy of ours.

Tay, more, if the circumstances

should occur again to-morrow, it were well the same executive action
should be called into speedy exercise.
But this is not the anxiety of many a patriot now.

Men of acknowl-

edged wisdom, some of them statesmen high in authority, are u ing their
eminent abilitie in endeavoring to construct from the Con. titution an interpretation opposed to the long e tabli hed convictions of the people, and
the teachings of the Fathers.
Lying at the foundation of all our libertie is the great Writ of freedom,
It is as to the establishment of a precedent that concern u mo tly now.

If the government is too weak, let us alter our Constitution and make it
stronger; but let us above all thing , preserve the integrity of that hallowed instrument in all its parts; but most e pecially in tho e features of
it which embrace and guarantee the liberties of the people.
The hope is, that the people may understand the nature and importance
of the whole subject; the fear is, that they may fail to bestow sufficient
care and interest upon it; for in defending thi, priceless Writ of liLerty,

we arc simply vindicating the authority of the people,
PHILADELPHIA,

Nm·ch, 1862.

REPLY TO HORACE BINNEY.

THE Con titution of the United States is a written instrument addres ed to the under tandings and conceptions
of the whole people. No other motive could possibly have
inspired in the minds of the wise and good men who devised the plan, the purposo to consummate it as it was.
One of the :first principles evolved by the framers of this
grand work, and which they deemod an element which was
in a great mea ure to ensure its uccess, was this, that the
authority which created this instrument should always be
able to comprehend what it did create; and as it was
created essentially by the people, there should be nothing
in it but what might always be understood by the most
humble and unlettered. Thi , in all republican governments, is the only basis upon which the structure of constitutional liberty can be succes fully rearetl.
Justice Story in descanting upon this very point remarks,
"a constitution of government is addressed to the common
sense of the people, and never was designed for trial of
logical skill, or vi ionary speculation." And Mr. Dallas
in reiterating the sentiment of Justice Story, gives it a
meaning still more enlarged.· "The Constitution," says
Mr. Dallas, "in its words is plain and intelligible, and it
is meant for the home-bred, unsophisticated understand-
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ing of our fellow citizens."
or will any one presume
to question both the nece ity and justice of thi po ition.
Under the shadow of thi Constitution, repo e certain
great principles, which con titute what we call American
Liberty.
The :fir t of these i , that this is a government of representation, as contra-di tingui hed from a pure democracy,
re ting upon the delegated authority of the people.
The second is,. that the will of the majority should be
recognized, and have the force of law within constitutional
limits.
The third is, that the law should be supreme ; and,
la tly, written con titution , deriving their authority from
the people, re tricting the powers of government in their
Legi "lative, Judicial and Executive capacities. The e,
e entially con titute what we are pleased to call American
Liberty.
It will be perceived that in all these the authority of the
people i paramount and decides; and every element, therefore, growing out of their own Con titution, owes it" existence and vitality to their own action. Nor, indeed, could it
be otherwise. A republican government could re t on no
other po ible basi , without contravening the authority of
the people, or cl e retain but a nominal exi tence. This will
be still more apparent by a casual reference to the manner
in which it is called into existence.
Man, to govern himself, must be a free-agent, nor can
any of his powers a
uch be either curtailed or infringed upon which he may deem necessary for selfgovernment and control. This is true also of republican
governments. When the power delegated ceases to re-
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spect the authority which conferred it, then that delegated
power cease at the same time to be an agent, and re olves
· itself into an usurpation. The republican government
becomes then only nominally so ; nor, do the re ults of
such as umption of power end here, but instigate to a
speedy consummation, by rapid strides to revolution
and anarchy. In a word, the people in constructing
a government for them elves, must have their absolute
rights, nor can these be opposed. and denied without defeating the purpose intended. The exercise of these absolute rjghts, protected by laws which the people in their
sovereign capacity make, is what constitutes in our republic, self-government.
And what are these rights? Personal security, per"onal
liberty, and the right to private property restrained by the
regulations of society. This power of action then, which
merely restrains, we call our civil and political liberty. In
England these rights are secured by Magna Charta and
their Habeas Corpus Act. Here they are secured to the
people by our Constitution.
or indeed, cou]d our Constitution have been created by the power which did create
it, without guaranteeing these rights in their amplest
sense. To have done otherwise would have been a recognition on the part of the people of the fact of their incapacity for self-government, and this would not have,
therefore, been a government of the people. Springing
out of the privileges of this writ of Habeas Corpus, is one
of the fundamental principles upon which the people acted
when they ratified our own Con titution ; and it cannot
be infringed upon in any of its essential features, much
less in an unconstitutional manner, without contravening
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the authority of the people, and forcing them to yield their
absolute rights as restrained by society, and yielding them,
not only forsake their free-agency, but every right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.
The bi tory of this famous Writ is intere"'ting, and should
be generally underi;;tood. It antiquity is remote. Among
the earlier purpo es for which it was used, was to recover
the freedom from which the individual had been unjustly
deprived. Nor was the assertion in favor of personal libcrt only contemporary with this writ. There has been
no age in which it has not found a champion, and there
has been no period in which its privilege has not been
boldly advocated. Neither was it, during all this time, without the sanction of law. It permeates the common law
as far back as we can trace it. It was not, therefore, wonderful that kingly power, actuated by motives at once arbitrary and despotic, should on all occasions attack it with
acrimony and vehemence. It was for this purpose that
Magna Charta merely declared that it should be the law of
the land. This it did in words which have made it familiar wherever civil or religious liberty have found a lodgment. "No man shall be taken or imprisoned but by the
lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."
Time and influences, powerful in themselves, tended to
operate against the force of this declaration. Those
entrusted with the power to enforce it, evaded it; until,
finally, through frequent and manifold violations, it
became almost inoperative. Its inefficacy reached its
culmination during the reign of Charles I., when the
Court of King's bench, out of which the Writ issued,
decided that they had no power whatever to release
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any one who had been imprisoned by command of
the King or the Lords of the Privy Council. But this
deci ion of the King's Dench was not allowed to pass
by without a loud and earne t protest. In the thied
year of the reign of Charle r., the Petition of Hight boldly
confronted thi decision by a erting, in language not to
be mistali:en, its utter illegality. The declaration it set
forth was, that " no freeman hould be imprisoned or detained without cause shown, to which he may make answer according to law." It was not the fault of the declaration in :Magna Charta that the rule there laid down
was being violated; but the defect lay in the fact that the
methods and moans in tituted for its enforcement was in
almost every e sential most imbecile and imperfect. The
provi 'ions enacted by 16 Charles I. proved aLo ineffectual.
These provisions were opposed and rendered abortive by
the power and tyranny of the judges. Per 'onal liberty
retained only a nominal existence.
It was re erved for a later period, and under the reign
of another monarch, for the completion of the provi ions
and the enactment of them into a law, whieh ever ince
has reassured and guarantied, not only to the people of
England, but to our own people, the safety and protection
of personal liberty.
This celebrated Act, passed in the reign of Charles II.,
(1679) is what is now always understood as the Ilabeas .
Corpus Act; and so much care was bestowed in framing
it, as to leave those subject to its provisions secure in the
enjoyment of the high privileges which it guaranties to
the citizen.
This, then, is the Act-the provisions ofit whi~h we have
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received as law here, reaffirmed in every written Constitution of every State, and which are guarantied in the largest
ense by the Constitution of the United States. Let us
state these provisions briefly. The Writ commands the
person to whom it is addressed, generally the Sheriff, to
have the body of the person who is alleged to be deprived
of his liberty, before the power or tribunal from which the
Writ itself :first is uecl; the person who it is said restrains
the l)risoner to be summoned also, and to be present, and
to bring with him the cau e of the restraint. This subjects the whole case to the ordering of the justice, upon
the facts which may be ubmitted.
Another provision is, that this Writ must always be
granted, and at any time, to the party deprived of his liberty, or to any other person who may think :fit to make
the application for him. It does not matter if a Court be
sitting or not, or whether the judges who compose the
·higher Courts be absent; it is a privilege as of right, which
mu t be complied with, and may, therefore, be granted by
any judge of any of the lower Courts, provided the application be made in writing, and is properly verified by the
person who makes it. The imposition of dispatch and
obedience upon the part of the officer to whom it is directed, is imperative. The service must be immediate,
and the writ forthwith returned, with a clear and concise
statement of all his actions in the transaction. This return being properly made, before a proper justice, the case
is ready for trial; and if there is not ufficient grounds for
his detention fully shown, he is at once discharged.
There may be in everal of the States, and are regulated
by statutes, alterations or conditions in one or_two of the
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other provi ions of thi act. Thus, for in tance, upon the
-evidence, the Court may not altogether discharge the pri-soner, but may hold him under bail. Also, ther~ is a
difference with regard to the cause for which originally
the person was impri oned. If it be for crime, or under
lawful warrant, in many of the States he can still have a
hearing; but if these things arc made apparent, of course
he is remanded.
The last general provi ion which I would mention is,
that after a p-erson has, on a hearing, been discharged, he
cannot be again deprived of his liberty and thru t into
prison for the same offence. These are the general provisions of this great act, in force throughout the length
and breadth of the land.
We now come to notice more particularly the question
in dispute.
The second clau e in the 9th section of the Constitution
read thus: "The Privilege of the Writ of Ilabea Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless, when in ca es of Rebellion
or Inva ion, the public afety may require it."
It is alleged that the Exeeutive may sn pend the privilege of this writ, under the above elause, without the
authority of Congress. The determination of what con titutes the public safety, as also when the contingency has
arisen to be left to the discretion of the Executive. This
power is not alleged, and indeed cannot be pretended to
be a urned in a strictly legal way. Thi 1 gal argument
may be stated in half a dozen words. As this writ is instituted by law, it will require :fir t a law passed by the
Legislature, before the Executive can execute, or the
Pro ident as the Executive officer, can legally order the
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act of imprisonment and detainer. This seems to be conclusive, and here evidently the case might rest; but, it is
insi ted than the que tion turns on higher ground than
the mere legal one. Vv c will stop to enquire how
there could well be any higher considerations than those
which the laws impose, provided those laws do not conflict with the Constitution, but have been enacted in conformity with, and to enforce its several provisions. These
higher grounds then, are said to be Constitutioual and
natural ones. In this aspect we propose to view the question. If we should deviate by touching occasionally the
confines of the legal argument, it will only be becausa we
have been invited so to do by the argument which we propose to examine.
Thi whole question seems to turn, in Mr. Binney~s
mind, as to the department most suitable to determine the
facts ari ing from the conditions. According to this, it
would seem that the Con titution might be authority for
Congre s to act, but not for the Executive to execute. Before we can tart to settle thi question upon this propo ition of Mr. Binney's, there arc several important points
which Mr. Binney inclines to take for granted, but which
must first be cleared away. If not, Mr. Binney a sumes
his premises under uch erious obstacles, that it will be
difficult for him to convince, relying simply upon the force
of his conclu ion.
It must first be decided whether this is not a negative
power of Congres , and that the clause has reference to
legislative enactment. It should next be settled, that if
the construction of the clause is doubtful, whether the
Judiciary ought not to dec~de; and besides, whether it is
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not its province to settle the question as to the properest
department to exercise the power. It trikes us sensibly,
that when all these perplexing difficulties have been satisfactorily adjusted without determining the whole matter
in dispute, then, and not till then, woul<l be the proper
time and place for Mr. Binney to tart hi proposition.

We are inclined to look at these serious obstacles in Mr.
Binney's way, and prove, if we can, that the question is
settled before be position of ~fr. B. can fairly be assumed.
Let us iu the first place, look at the instrument itself.
Of the manner of its interpretation, we arc not <lisposcd to
quibble. If we regard it as an embodiment of laws, then
let it be interpreted either by rule accepted everywhere,
and as Blackstone defines it, h.r the words of the bw, by
the context, the subject matter, the effect and consequences,
and by the reason o:r spirit of the law, or by the rule laid
down in 9 Wheaton 1. "The framers of the Con titution
mu t be un<lerstood to have employed words in tLeir
natural sense, aud to have intended what they have said;
and in con truing the extent of the powers whieh it
creates, there is no other rule than to consider the language of the instrument which confers them, in connection
with the pul'poses for which they were conferred."
By either, we arc willing to have our po ition tested.
rrhe 8th section of tbe Con titntion defines the affirmative powers of Congress. The luth clau ·e read thus:
"r_ro provide for calling forth the militia to execute
the laws of the Union, suppres insurrections and repel invasious." Giving Congress not only the war-making
power, but also the power to "suppress in urrections and
repel invasions." There is no ambiguity here; and the

.
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power thus vested in Congress to " uppress insuITections
and repel invasions," presupposes the capacity of Congress
to determine when it ball exercise that power. The 18th
and last clause of this section, reads as follows: "To make
all laws which hall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all otlie1· powers
ve tcd by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof."
The 9th section defines the negative or restrictive
powers of Congress. To this section we desire to call
more particular attention. The first clause of this section
ha reference to "the migration or importation of uch
persons a any of the states now existing shall think
proper to admit, hall not be prohibited by Congress, &c."
Then immediately after occurs the clan e :
"The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
su pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or inva ion
the public afety may require it." This, read in conjunction with the first clause of the section, seems to make the
intent so clear that it is difficult to see how it can be misinterpreted. It would have been not only superfluous, but
ridiculous to have written after the word "suspended"by Oongresg.
This section is .defining the negative powern of Congres .
It expres es in the first clause the department to which is
confined the power therein stated, but the implied power
is not changed in the second or the third clan e. This will_
be still more apparent by reading. the clause which follows
the second: "No bill of attainder or ex-post facto law hall
be passed.''
Passed by whom? No one ques-tions what branch of
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the government was here meant; there could have been
none other intended but Congress, y t it is not namedneither is it in the fourth and fifth. It would have been
simply and clearly absurd. This will be perceived at a
glance.
" The migration &c. of such person as any of the State
&c., shall not be prohibited by Congress."
" The privilege of the writ of Habea Corpus shall not
be &c., suspended by Congress."
"No bill of attainder &c. shall be pa sed by Congress."
" o capitation or other direct tax hall be laid by Congress," &c.
If left out in the second, why left out in the third, fourth,
and fifth clauses? And now when we read the :fifteenth
clause of the eighth section, which gives to Congres the
power to suppress in urrections, and also, the determination when the public afcty may require the exercise
of that power, in connection with the eighteenth clause
of that section: "To make all laws which shall be
neces ary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United State , or in any
department or officer thereof," there can be no escape
from the conclusion of the authority of Congre over the
clause in question, when the very cause of such suspension
shall arise uncter a contingency which in the fifteenth
clause of the eighth section is left entirely in the hands of
Congress.
Notwithstanding the seemingly plain and clear conclusion at which we may arrive from all this it is alleged
that the exception which the clause create i in favor of

If>

the Execntive.* If it is of doubtful construction, it is difficult to sec how the Executive can claim the benefit of the
doubt and a ume the power. Who is to decide? Can the
Executive ?-not without Yiolatillg the letter of the very
commi ion which he holds as a branch of one of the department of government. The several departments aro
co-ordinate, made so by the very terms of their offices, and,
therefore, it i not in the power of the Executive of either
determiuing or a ·urning what hould be tlic extent of tho
powers of either. Nor did the tates in their written Constitution pass this grave "ubjcct by without explicit reference. Nearly all of them cxpre sly declared that there
should never be either an interference by or au exercise of
the <lutic of one departm llt by another. If, then, the
Executive ha as::;umcd this privilege upon bis own rcRponsibility, mer ly becau e he con idcred him elf rnfficient to
determine hi right, and if the w ight of implication be
again 't him, if the positive weight of ]aw be against him,
th n the weight of doing an unconstitutional act is against
him, and his assumption of the xcrption i an encroachment. If it is not, who i. to deci<l.c? The Executive? Ile
cannot, beirw one Lranch of a o-overnmont which i co-ordinate. But, it is answered, there must be an adequate
power somewhere in the government to meet every contingency, why not the Ex cutive? Is it a question of <loubt?
Ye.. Shall the E.,,ecutive then determine or the Legislature? Neither, you say, can, being co-ordinate. The
power mu t exi::;t some·w hcre; where i it? There i:, but ono
fountain of power, the people. But how, you a k, can that
power be exercised in a contingency? What becomes of the

* Horace Binney.
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adequate power existing in the government to meet every
contingency? Just here is the point. If there is a doubt,
should it not be in favor of that department whose peculiar
province it is to settle and determine just such doubts
arising under the Constitution; and more especially when
Congress has by enactment clothed this department with
authority to act upon this very point. If, then, the construction is doubtful, what becomes of the judiciary power
to define the meaning and intent of the powers vested by
the Constitution and of the laws enacted by Congress
under the Con titution? It is alleged, "the clause authorizes, it is but for the Executive to act." But the Executive
action is but an implication at most, and who is to decide?
The judiciary? The judiciary has decided against the implied power re ting with the Executive. If it was intended
to leave it "open" to be assumed hy the department most
fit to assume, then the conclusion that the danse already
authorizes and the Executive niust execute, is not reconcilable. How can this construction be placed upon the clause
and the que tion remain "open"?
Then it would seem if the construction be doubtful in
the second clause of the ninth section; and if Congress
has enacted a law under article third of the Constitution
on the powers of the judiciary, part of which act bas especial reference to this very second clause of the ninth section, wherein that law defines their powers on the issuing of the writ, it is clear that Congress has authorized
that power to the judic'iary, and that that department acts
under the law enacted. The third article in the Constitution, under ·which Congress has enacted, makes no particular refer~mce to the character or nature of the act. It
2
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was the same power exercised by Congress under the 15th
clause of the 8th section. If, then, the delegated authority
is acknowledged here, can there be any mistake that the
18th clause in the 8th section, which reads: "To make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the government of the United
States in any depa,r tment or officer thereof," covers as
completely what precedes it, wherein the affirmative powers of Congress are expressed, as what follows, wherein
the negative or restrictive powers are defined. If, then, it
covers these, it embraces, of course, the clause or clauses
under which the act of 1789 was passed. The whole of
article 3d seems to authorize, but Congress has chosen to
set forth what it does authorize. Then it would appear,
really, if we would for the sake. of the argument admit that
the 2d clause in the 9th section does authorize, and if it is
doubtfu1 which department should act, it would be competent for the judiciary, under the powers vested by Congress under the act of 1789, to decide, and such competency might be deducted from the act itself. And it
would seem, besides, that if this act gives the judiciary
the power to issue the writ, it would convey the power
to remand under the provisions of the act. The privilege seems to be in their custody confided by Congress by
enactment, and, therefore, nothing but the authority which
conferred it can take it away by a repeal of the act itself;
for this privilege is exercised by the judiciary, not under
the Constitution, but under the act of 1789. Why, therefore, may not the judiciary, acting under the law of 1789,
to whom is given power to issue the writ and to inquire
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into the cause of commitment, extend their authority over
the 2d clause of the th section, as being embraced within
their power as to enable them to determine when the public safety may require a su pension of the privilege? Why
not? Merely because this department has decided to the
contrary. In ex parte Bolman, Chief Justice Marshall says:
" That if at any time the public safety should require the
suspen ion of the power vested by thi act (1789,) in the
courts of the United State , it is for the Legi ]ature to say
so. That question depends on political considerations on
which the Legislature i:s to decide. Until the legislative
will be expre ed, this court can only see its duty and
obey the laws." This may have been obiter, but it is conclusive for two rea ons:
1st. Becau e this opinion bas never been deviated from
since, and
2d. Becau e it show what would have been the deeision
of the court had the question been fairly pre ented.
Chief Jn. tice Marshall' opinion, no doubt, was arrived
at from two considerations which Mr. Binney has endea-vored to use and rely upon in support of his own position.
These con iderations mu t have presented themselvc to
the Chief Justice's mind after a careful investigation of
the history of the clause, and of an antagoni m of analogy
between our own and the Briti h Constitution. The broad,
general, ample suggestion of Pinckney, cannot be tortured
into any construction le than what must be evident to ,
every mind by the- mere reading. Ilere it i .
" The privilege-s and benefits of the writ of Habeas Cor-pus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditiouc, and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by
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the Legislature, e..."'{ccpt upon the must urgent and pressing
occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding
months."
Whatever the committee on style and arrangement may
have done afterwards, does not alter the intent; and the
position of the clause is conclusive as to the general
acquiescence of the members of the convention, that as
amended and placed, it embraced Mr. Pinckney's suggestion.
And, perhaps, too, Justice Marshall had in view the
.analogy (?) of the British Constitution, when by this opinion he enunciated a principle which seems to bear a
.striking resemblance to that. And \vhat was that principle? That the whole system of the organization of the
states is entirely of a representative, and not in any part
or particular of an imperial character.
It is very difficult, therefore, to sec how the executive can
appropriate this power to himself, when the judiciary,
even under the act of (1789,) expresses the opinion that
not only is the power not lodged there, but that it is lodged
in, and docs belong to the Legislature.
'· If the Constitution," says Mr. Binney, "had said an
Ilabeas Corpus Act, or an act to be enacted, then there
might have been ome ground for the Legislature enacting." But Mr. Binney admits there was no Ilabeas Corpus Act when the Constitution was formed. Of course,
then, the English statute was in force. Evon after the
Judiciary Act was passed, it was decided in Ex parte Watkins, 3 Peters ; "that the general reference to a power
which the court are required to exercise, without any precise definition of that power, imposes the nece sity of
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making some inquiry into Hs use, according to that law
which is in a considerable degree incorporated into our
own." The court proceed" to state, that it was essential
to refer to 31 Charles II, which was stated to be an enforcement of the common law. The court determined
their action by this law. We received thi , then, as a
legi lative act. It was incorporated into our own law as a
legislative act of Parliament, and it had force as such. It
coul~ scarcely be supposed, that the Constitution should
provide for the suspension of the privilege of an act, which
had not been enacted, and which had no exi tence. It
might have remained obsolete forever. If the personal
privilege under an act of arrest and detention was all that
was meant, then under the act of 1789 the Judiciary bad
the power.
But says Mr. Binney, "the gist of the question seems
then to be this, whether it requires an act of the Legislature, to declare that Rebellion or Invasion exists in the
country, and that the public safety requires the suspen ion
of the privilege. If it does, tben Congre~ alone ha the
power to pass such an act; if it does not, then the power
of enforcing the execution falls necessarily to the executive."
As well might Mr. Binney argue that the 4th clause in
the 9th sec., which reads: "No capitation or other direct
tax shall be laid, unle in proportion to the census or
enumeration herein before directed to be taken," would
be incumbent on Congress to pass an act declaring that
such a tax ought to be laid, before tbey would have the
power to enact it. Or to declare that a tax ought to
be laid in "proportion to the census or enumeration,
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&c., and then proceed to enact under the clause, which
makes it imperative to enact under the very conditions
declared upon. The first would not only be superfluous,
but unwarrantable, and thereby of itself, unconstitutional.
"And no legi lative act is neces ary, unless, and this is
the gist of the whole question, a legi lative act is necessary
to ascertain the conditions of the exception."
Then, it is presumed, unless Congress legislated on the
conditions of the 4th clause in the 9th sec., the clause would
levy a tax of itself; or if Congress passed a bill levying
a tax under the general clause, it would be uncon titutional because Congre s did not first declare as to the condition . The express power to lay a tax is given to Congress,
but the executive is just as competent to ascertain the
conditions of the exceptions in this clause as Congress,
and therefore, according to Mr. Binney, no legislative
action is nece sary. Then, although Congress ha the
general power to lay a tax, yet under this clause no legislation is essential, because it enacts itself. If a legislative
act is then essential to ascertain the conditions in this
clause, before Congre can enact, it is equally imperative
in the 2d clause of the same section, under the general
power of Congress in the 18th clause of the 8th ec. If
it is not necessary here, neither i it in the 2d clause ; for
the executive can just as well and with as much propriety
execute without the authority of Congress here, although
that power is expre sly given to Congress in the 1 t clause
of the 8th sec., as he can in the 2d clause of the 9th sec.,
where the power is ju t as impei~atively given to Congress
in the 18th clause of the 8th sec.
"The Constitution authorizes, it is but for the executive
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to execute," asserts Mr. Binney. As well might Mr. B.
argue that the Con titution authorizes in the fourth fifth
'
'
and sixth clauses of the ninth section, and because it does
so authorize, the executive may execute. Execute what?
It is the province of the executive to execute law , not to
make them. But it may be readily answered, in the
above mentionecl clau es the power is given to Congress.
True. But wherein con ists the difference? In the second clan e of the 9th section, Mr. B. affirms the Constitution authorizes, and it fall as a matter of course on the
executive to act. To execute what? Congress has not
enacted ; and in the 18th clause of the 8th section this
power is clearly given to Congrc s. "To make all laws
which hall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof."
But independent of all thi , how can the President
execute, when he does not know whether he has the
power or not? What is to prevent a conflict at the
same time between all the departments? The Legislature says we have not authorized. The Judiciary ays,
if to any department belongs the power to decide, it is
ours under the act of 1789. Says the Pre ident, I have
the right to as ume the power. All we a k, responds the
Legislature, is to authorize you to assume. But I will
execute without your authority, responds the President.
You cannot, an wers the Judiciary, we have so decided.
The authority is vested in the Lcgi lature, we arc acting
under that authority, and you are co-ordinate with us and
mu t bow to the same power.
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Then it would seem, under the 18th clause of the 8th
section, if it was not essential for Congress to enact, it is
not essential or proper for the executive to execute. Nay,
more; until Congress deemed it proper to enact on a partially restraining power of it own, it was clearly incompetent for the executive to act.
But it is alleged by Mr. Binney that the duty "both to
decide the fact of rebellion, and to measure the danger of
the public ari ing from it, and what the public safety requires in this behalf, do belong to the executive office of
the Pre ident," and he cites hi po\ver to call forth the
militia to supp1·e s insurrection and repel invasion, as an
argument in defence of his position. Let us look at this.
The 15th clau e of the 8th section is as follows : " To
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress in urrections and repel inva ions.,,.
To carry out more specrn.cally the force of this clause,
Congress passed an act known as the act of 1795. This
act gives the executive the power, whenever the laws of
the U nitod States are violated or opposed, o.r their execution obstructed in any State by combinations too powerful
to be suppressed by.the ordinary cour e of judicial proeeodings, or by the U. S. Marshal ,. to call forth the mili.
tia of any Stat~ or State a may be necessary to suppress
such combinations or insurrections. The President, when
he deems it es ential to use such military force, shall £.rst
issue hi proclamatjon, commanding such instugents to
disper e and retire to their homes within a limited time.
To accomplish hi purpose, he may use both tho land and
naval force . Those are the es ential features of the whole
act.. And now1 it will be remembered, it is alleged '" an
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act of detention by the department which is competent to
ascertain the conditions of the exception, together with
the effect imparted by the Constitution, is sufficient, and
no legislative act is necessary, unless a legislative act is necessary to ascertain the conditions of the exception." But
why pass a legislative act to ascertain the conditions of
the exception which are expre ly stated in the clause?
Does it require an act of Congress to declare that rebellion and in-yasion do exist, before the right and power
of Congress to pass an act authorizing their suppression
be concluded? As well might it be argued that Cougress
should have waited until the contingency had ari en, then
passed an act declaring that such a contingency had arisen,
before they passed the act of 1795, by virtue of the 15th
clause of the 8th section of the Constitution. Nor can we
perceive why we should not have the benefit of the very
argument used here to support the executive right. Ile is
not required to perform any specialty as to the existence
of rebellion or invasion, or as to the requirement of the
public safety. Ile i but to determine for himself, and
then to act. Why should more be required of Congress?
To determine, it is true, but not to pass an act decl~ring
that they had determined. This is, then, for what we
are contending. The authority to suspend rests solely
with the Legi lature. As to how the necessity which may
call for the exercise of that authority may be set forth in
the act, is of no moment. The authority to suspend presupposes that the necessity bas ari en, whether it be declared or not. The act to suspend carries with it the necessity. If, then, it is constitutional for the executive to
exercise the privilege without authority of the Legislature,
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according to his own discretion, then it would be just as
constitutional for him not to use the privilege at all, whatever the necessity, for in his estimation the contingency
may never arrive.
But Mr. Binney asserts that this power is used by the
Executive in cases of rebellion or invasion. That in these
cases he is left to determine the necessity when that power
shall be exercised, as also when the contingency has arisen
to apply the means for its suppression. If it is conceded
in these instances, why not in the others? We answer:
1. That the Executive exercises this power not by virtue
of any expressed authority in the Constitution, but by
virtue of a law enacted by Congress, conferring that
power, under the 15th clause of the 8th section of the
Constitution.
2. Because the Supreme Court has decided tba.t under
that enactment, not under the clause in the Constitution,
the discretion shall be left to the Executive to determine
when the necessity may arise. This is all that Van Martin
v. Mott, 12 Wheaton, decides.
3. This conferred power on the Executive, owes its existence to the power that conferred it, the Legislature ;
therefore the Executive acts because Congress has authorized the Executive to act, and the Executive in doing so,
is but fulfilling his Constitutional obligations, "to see that
the laws are faithfully executed."
4. The exercise of this power does not jeopardize nor
contravene any of the fundamental rights of the people,
which they exercised in the construction of their government.
5. It is an acknowledgment of the great principle, that
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the power to do this has been derived, after all, from the
people through their representatives.
But the other instance i very different. Congress has
enacted no law conferring any power on the Executive
under the clause in question. It has not authorized him,
becau e it has not enacted. If, then, under the 15th
clau e, it wa left ,vith Congress to provide for the suppression of rebellion and invasion, and Congress has provided
by enacting a law, conferring tho power on the Executive,
which authority the Executive acknowledges and acts
under, why shall Congress authorize here, when the conditions are the same?
It i argued that the Legislature cannot "executively
suspend." Who questions this? "All that a legislative
body can do, is to authorize suspension." Who doubts
this, and it is all we claim. "But the Constitution having
authorized this, there is no room for legislative power."
But from what premises is this conclu ion drawn? Is there
a greater implication that the Constitution authorizes the
Executive, than that it does not? If there is not, the
whole argument by which the Executive authority is maintained, would seem to fall. It would seem to fall by virtue of the acknowledged authority of Congre by the
Executive under the law of 1795. That law embodie the
authority of Congress. Under that authority the Executive
acts, and not under the clause in the Constitution. Then
if it is granted tliere, where the conditions are similar, the
force of implied powers goes here with Congrc s.
The question recurs, which i the mo t proper department to exercise this power? In our mind there is no
room for this question now to present itself, for we think
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we have shown that the instrument itself has settled it.
But it cannot be satisfactorily urged the Executive? It
cannot be thus urged becau c the Supreme Court has
decided that under 1.hc act of 1795, the discretion is loft
with the E.,recutive to determine the necessity? And, yet,
this appears to be one of the principal gro~nds a urned
by those who defend the E.,recutive right. That discretion,
be it remembered, has reference to the suppression of
rebellion, of acts again t law and order, and therefore, the
performance of this Executive duty conflicts not with any
of the privileges of the people which belong to them by
virtue of the Constitution. But this is to decide whether
and when the groat writ of freedom shall be suspended,
conflicting with the chiefest privilege of the people, personal liberty. It cannot be supposed that the people
meant to 1 ave with the Executive the sole power to determine the occa ion and to e~rercise the privilege of suspension at his pleasure? It cannot be seriou ly entertained
that the Con titution gives impliedly a power to the Executive, which the king of Great Britian docs not pos ess.
If thi i ·what is meant and intended in the Constitution,
then this is not a government of the people, for the Executive a umes a privilege which the peop1u can only authorize through the legislature ; and, if, on the other hand, it
was not so meant and intended, then its as umption by the
Executive, is an encroachment dangerous to the liberties
of the people.
As to the danger which might result, it must be admitted that not only would the possibility exist, but the probability that such an a umption of power thus exercised
might at any moment be perverted; nor would the rivalry
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of opposing factions, instigated by this assumption of
power., weaken the rrobable danger. True, the Executive
may be impeached; but before this could be made effective the anticipated evil may have been consummated.
· Did the framers, then, of the Constitution intend to
confer a power on the Executive greater than that possessed by the authority which bestowed upon him the
trust which he holds? Di<l. they intend to vest in him an
authority, the undue exercise of which might, at any
moment, defeat the very object for which the government
was formed? If he is left to determine the exigency
which may de_mand the exercise of this power, and also to
exercise it upon his determination independent of legislation, may he not determine in its very exercise the existence of the government itself? If, however, the implied
power veste<l in Congress is conceded, and if the Legislature is left to authorize the Executive to execute, then, if
in the exercise of this power the public safety may be endangered, it would be under a contingency which could
not have been avoided, which had to be met and confronte<l by the authority of the people under the Constitution, and if it then failed, it would have been the failure
of an experiment faithfully tried by those who had the
right to test it, and to whose car~ it was properly entrusted.
W ou]d not the consent of the Legislature more truly have
reflected the will of the people, and thereby the exercise
of this privilegB have strengthened the hands of the
Executive?
\Ve think, therefore, it is clear from all this, that the
Constitution in the clause in question is defining the negative or restrictive power of Congress. If this is so, then
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Congress must autlwrize. The authority vested in Congress
under the 15th clause of the 8th section does not authorize Congress to authorize some other department of government to carry out the clause in question. And yet this is
the exact way in which and by which the Executive exercises his power under the law enacted by Congress under
that very clause. If Congress cannot authorize because
the Constitution already authorizes, then the law under
which tp.e Executive acts, passed, 1795, is invalid, and
strips the executive of the power which it confers. And
if the Constitution is not referring to a negative power of
Congress in the 2d clause of the 9th section, then neither
is it in the third, fourth, and :fifth. If it then authorizes
in the second clause, so does it in the third, fourth, and
fifth, without mentioning which department shall authorize. If the dispute turns upon the mere question as to
what department of the government the exercise of this
power should belong, then the power conveyed in the·
third, fourth, and fifth clauses is as applicable to the Executive as the second.
And it must not be forgotten, that under tho act of
1792, the first one passed by Congresr. under the 15th
clause, Congress did not therein decide the competency
of the Executive to determine when to act, but gave that
power to an associate or district judge of the United
States, whose duty it was to notify the President that the
laws of the United States were being opposed before the
power given to him by that act could be exercised.
We may safely conclude that the Constitution cannot
authorize an encroachment, therefore it cannot authorize
a violation of iti own authority. If the Constitution be a
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law for the government of the people, then that law cannot authorize what it violates in authorizing. It ceases to
be what it purports, a rule of action, and therefore is no
law at all. We think we may gather from the proceedings
of the convention which framed the Constitution, from the
declaration of rights, and from the Con titution it elf, the
evident intent a to the power of the Legislature over the
2d clau e of the 9th section. If this is clear, then the
Con. titution cannot be said to authorize this in it elf. If
it does it authorizes an encroachment. Nothing but the
authority of Congress can cure thi . The execution of
that authority is left with the Executive, which, after all,
operates only as a check upon him in accordance with the
long establi hed and better under tood principle upon
which the government was founded, that the people,
through their representative , ARE THE ONLY REAL AND TRUE
DEPOSITORY OF POWER.

